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FREE RIDING AND COLLECTIVE ACTION:
AN EXPERIMENT IN PUBLIC MICROECONOMICS*
FRIEDRICH SCHNEIDER AND WERNER W. POMMEREHNE
The well-known free-rider hypothesis is examined experimentally to see (i)
whether individuals behave systematically as free riders when systematic incentives
to do so are created, and (ii) the extent to which free riding actually occurs. Though
the experiment's participants behaved in accordance with the hypothesis, the quan-
titative extent to which such behavior occurred was rather modest. From this it may
be concluded that the free-rider hypothesis as presently stated indicates an incom-
pleteness in standard public microeconomics rather than providing a description of
the real world.
The free-rider hypothesis is one of the "evergreens" of economic
literature. In 1740 Hume [Part II, Book 2] was already describing the
inclination of individuals to profit from collective activities without
making a fair contribution of their own; and today there is almost
nothing written on public goods that does not contain at least a ref-
erence to this problem. This behavior is said to arise when prohibitive
costs make exclusion of individuals from the consumption of a good
impossible. People will then act strategically by (depending on the
mode of financing) stating a willingness-to-pay for the public good
that is either higher or lower than their true willingness-to-pay.
Free riding has achieved even greater importance in the literature
in recent years because research has shown that incentives for non-
disclosure are not restricted to public goods. As Satterthwaite [1975]
has shown using a basic impossibility theorem, there may be incen-
tives not to state true preferences even in an economy without ex-
ternalities and with only private goods. The nature of the incentives
involved does not depend solely on whether a good is public or private,
but on the size of the group involved as well: As the number grows,
it becomes increasingly less attractive for the individual to conceal
his/her true preferences when private goods are concerned, and in-
creasingly more attractive with public goods.
Presumably this impossibility theorem can be evaded—as in the
case of the Arrow impossibility theorem by restricting the admissible
individual preferences.' Approaching the matter from another angle,
* We are grateful to students at the University of Zurich for their (unwitting) help
in the experiment, to Bruno S. Frey and Peter Zweifel for helpful comments on an
earlier version of this paper, to two anonymous referees, and to the editorial board of
this Journal for most valuable suggestions. We also thank the participants of two
seminars held at the universities of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and Carleton (Ot-
tawa) for stimulating discussions, and Sandra Stuber for editing the paper for En-
glish.
1. See Arrow [19771
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decentralized mechanisms for motivating people to reveal their true
willingness-to-pay can be developed theoretically. Such mechanisms
would depend on a system of reward and punishment, both functions
of the stated willingness-to-pay. 2 How effective these incentive-
compatible mechanisms would be, however, is debatable. Smith [1977,
1979a, 1979b, 1980] has concluded from the results of his experiments
that there are indeed decentralized mechanisms that can facilitate
efficient collective-good decisions. But his experiments were done with
small groups only, and under the condition of unanimity of the indi-
vidual decision-makers before the final group decision was made.
Applying his procedure to a typical public-good situation (many
people, no condition of unanimity, prohibitive transaction costs within
the group) could lead to quite different results. 3 Other economists
have shown that the individuals themselves may be able to manipulate
the demand-revealing mechanisms; and, further, that incentives may
arise for forming coalitions and stating biased group preferences. 4
In this paper the free-rider phenomenon is approached from a
different perspective. The argument here presented is that the present
free-rider hypothesis may reflect incompleteness of standard eco-
nomic theory rather than a description of the real world. Indeed, as
we shall briefly discuss in Part I, there may be some forces in the in-
dividual's decision-making process for public goods that run counter
to her/his inclination to take a free-rider position. The extent to which
free riding will actually occur in reality is thus a matter for empirical
research. To try to discover whether this might be the case, we con-
ducted an experiment structured to allow us to measure the extent
to which people will behave as a free rider in a particular situation.
This is discussed in Part II, and the results evaluated in Part III. They
confirm those of past studies and previous experiments done by others
which indicate that free riding cannot always be presumed to occur.
They show that there is no voluntary revelation of true full willing-
ness-to-pay, but the disclosure of demand is much greater than might
have been predicted on the basis of the literature, which tends to stress
the strength of the free-rider incentive.
2. For these mechanisms, see Clarke [1971], Tideman [1972], Groves [1973],
Tideman and Tullock [1976], and Groves and Ledyard [19771. Surveys of what have
come to be numerous contributions on the subject are given in Clarke [1978] and Green
and Laffont [1978].
3. Also see the carefully done experiment by Scherr and Babb [1975], who examine
two demand-revealing mechanisms of the same incentive structure for whether the
willingnesses-to-pay whose declaration they lead to are identical. The null hypothesis;
i.e., that the stated willingnesses-to-pay are identical, is rejected.
4. See, e.g., Roberts [1976], Green and Laffont [1978], and various contributions
in a supplementary volume of Public Choice, XXIX (April 1977). A critical evaluation
of the most important incentive-compatible mechanisms is given in Mueller [1979].
FREE RIDING AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
	 691
I. PITFALLS IN THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF FREE RIDING
The free-rider hypothesis as stated by Samuelson [1954], Mus-
grave [1959, Ch. 1], and others, and repeated in public economics
textbooks, says that public goods will inevitably be undersupplied as
compared with the Pareto-optimal amount. A stronger version of this
hypothesis, which seems to be supported for instance by Olson [1965,
pp. 48ff.], goes even farther and asserts that some public goods will
not be provided at all.
This dominating importance attributed to the free rider, how-
ever, has not gone unquestioned. Stigler [1974], for instance, has
pointed out that the usual assumptions do not suffice to explain why
firms and individuals voluntarily join an organization that produces
a private and a public good (e.g., a trade association providing a public
intermediate good in addition to a private good). Under the as-
sumption that a firm or individual will still be able to enjoy the public
good without contributing to the organization, the rational deci-
sion-maker should join a rival organization (producing only the private
good, and thus be able to offer it at a lower price) and try to free ride
on the public good provided by the first organization. 5
 One possible
explanation for the fact that such free riding does not always occur,
Stigler argues, is that the public good may have a number of distinct
characteristics, and in order for a firm or individual to ensure that the
public intermediate good actually provided has the particular mixture
of characteristics that it wishes, it must take part in the collective
action needed to provide the public good.
McMillan [1979a] has recently provided another possible ex-
planation. He takes the case of repetitive decisions made by firms on
public intermediate goods. In such a dynamic context there may be
incentives not to behave as a free rider (incentives that do not exist
in a static framework) because there is a cost attached to free riding.
The effect of a firm's decision will be observed by the others and will
influence their behavior in the future. If it is seen that the supply of
public goods is falling due to free riding of a firm, and if all other firms
react to this by reducing their own contributions to the provision of
the public good, then the benefit derived from free riding will soon
be outweighed by the disadvantage of being provided with an indi-
5. It is evident that this case is not covered by Olson's [1965j "by-product" theory
which hypothesizes that an organization will produce a public and a private good joined
together in some way and where a person (or firm) can be excluded from enjoying the
private good if he/she does not contribute to the provision of the public good. It is ob-
vious that such an institutional arrangement can keep a firm or individual from taking
a strong free-rider position.
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vidually suboptimal amount of the public good in the future (provided
that future benefits are not discounted too heavily).
In the case where the public good is a consumption good, how-
ever, we can expect free riding to occur to a greater extent. But even
here there may be incentives not to take a strong free-rider position.
As proposed by McMillan [1979b], each individual may have an a
priori idea (represented by a probability distribution) as to the likely
amount of the public good that will be provided as the aggregate result
of all the individuals' decisions. In each period each person will ob-
serve how much of the public good she/he is consuming and revise
her/his prior estimate in line with this experience. Such a learning
process according to McMillan can explain why individuals may not
be inclined to free ride to a very great extent,6
 and casts some doubt
on the strong version of the free-rider hypothesis.
The question of whether there may be forces that run counter
to the individual's tendency to be a free rider is addressed on a broader
basis by various authors.? Brubaker [1975]. for instance, has criticized
the free-rider discussion for stressing and developing fully only those
arguments that support and emphasize the importance of free riding.
Possible motives for more collectively conscious behavior, on the other
hand, are neglected. However, it may be, as recently emphasized by
Margolis [1981], that individuals internalize their societies' standard
of proper conduct so that, in effect, the individual's perception of the
degree to which he/she is "behaving properly" or "sharing fairly" (a
concept introduced by Margolis) enters as a separate argument in
her/his utility functions. Similarly, Johansen [1977] and Richter [1978]
have pointed out that economists treat free-rider behavior as being
context-free, that they consider the tendency to free ride as a basic
characteristic of human nature.8 It is quite possible that the individual
may be guided by the advantages of a cooperative solution and willing
to contribute toward it, provided that he/she receives some assurance
that the other members of the community will also make an appro-
priate contribution toward helping to realize some specific level of
provision of the public good in question. An individual may realize
that the community has to make such a commitment or the public
good will not be available for anyone. He/she may fear that the other
members of the community, for whatever reasons, will not commit
6. It may even be the case that the system reaches a Pareto optimum through such
a trial and error process; see McMillan [1979b].
7. See Brubaker [1975, 1979], Johansen [1977], Guttman [1978], and Richter
[1978].
8. And in nearly all contributions to the subject the free rider is reduced to the
role of a player in a noncooperative game; see, e.g.. Groves and Ledyard [1977[.
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enough of their resources to achieve it; but he/she may also, as Bru-
baker [1975, p. 152] has stated, "count on the community to commit
itself to the purchase. Since he is counting on the rest of the commu-
nity for the necessary tender, he may be willing to reciprocate by
participating in a commitment to it."
These and some other arguments9
 cast some doubt on the validity
of the strong version of the free-rider hypothesis. It might be useful
to examine an alternative, for example, that people may be disinclined
to violate the norm that calls for honesty, and will thus reveal their
true willingness-to-pay for a proposed amount of a public good. Both
hypotheses can also be formulated more weakly. They are not mu-
tually exclusive, but can provide a point of departure for a reconsid-
eration of the free-rider problem.
The following section discusses an experiment that was carried
out in order to get an idea of the importance of free riding in the real
world. Theoretical reasoning alone clearly cannot settle this point.
The experiment was conducted in such a way as to allow us (1) to
examine whether the participants—depending on the different in-
centives offered by the experiment's three phases—behaved sys-
tematically as free riders; and (2) to measure the extent to which free
riding occurred.
II. THE EXPERIMENT
A. Description of the Experiment
In order to examine experimentally the extent to which people
will behave as free riders, one has to create a situation characterized
by a large group and a real public good. This requires that the cost of
transactions within the group be very high; that there be nonrivalry
in consumption of the good considered; that there be no possibility
of exclusion of individuals from enjoyment of the public good; and
that individuals recognize clearly the numerical imperceptibility of
their decisions. 1° Our procedure was similar to that used in a recent
9. These are discussed in greater detail by Brubaker [1975, p. 154]. In essence he
argues the following: (i) in the case of public goods, the individual may positively value
the knowledge that his "trading partners" also regard the contract as satisfactory; (ii)
there may be interdependent preference functions; and (iii) the imminent breakdown
of the provision of a public good (such as law and order) may present such a strong
imperative for group action that it overwhelms the free-rider calculations.
10. Individual numerical imperceptibility, a concept introduced by Brubaker
[1979], relates to whether a public-good situation is really created: The individually
perceived group size must be large enough for the individual to see that he/she is not
able to estimate the size of her/his latent demand relative to the aggregate, and thus
the effect of his/her own offer on the total outcome.
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experiment by Brubaker [1979], but we modified the situation in three
ways: (1) We wanted to eliminate the biases that can arise when only
those people who are very interested and who may therefore be more
inclined to cooperate, compose the experiment's sample. We thus
included as actual participants all of the individuals whom we origi-
nally approached. This has not been done in any of the previous ex-
periments, and their results may thus be open to question due to the
unknown direction and extent of the biases. (2) Every participant was
involved in every phase of our experiment. We did not break them
up into separate groups, each of which was subjected to only one ex-
perimental situation, as has been done in nearly all other experiments.
As we thus have a decision from each participant at every stage of the
experiment, it is also possible to analyze which kinds of restrictions
might have influenced the individual's decision. (3) The participants
were deliberately not informed (and did not realize) that they were
involved in an experiment in order to create a situation that would
very closely approach the real world.
Our experiment was carried out with a class of forty-seven eco-
nomics students at the University of Zurich. In order to create a rel-
evant and realistic situation, a woman posing as the representative
of a publishing company" offered specimen copies of an economics
textbook written by the class's professor (who, as the students were
aware, was actually working on such a book). 12
 The 550-page text was
described as containing all of the material covered in the lecture
courses dealing with the particular field, which would make it a most
suitable basis for preparing for the upcoming final comprehensive (not
end-of-semester) examinations. The students were told that the book
would appear on the market in eighteen months, when it would be
available at a student price of Swiss Francs (SFr.) 40 and a regular
price of SFr. 55. 13
 The publisher, however, was said to be interested
in getting comments and suggestions from the book's prospective
audience that might help make it even more attractive and interesting.
They were therefore making specimen copies available in four to six
months, about a year ahead of publication date. Forty-four of the
forty-seven students were to have their final examination before the
textbook's publication in 1980/81 and thus, had a strong incentive to
11. We would like to thank Haiga Jaick for playing the role of the representative.
She did a great deal toward the creation of the feeling of an authentic situation.
12. The textbook's author was deliberately absent during the experiment in order
to minimize this having an influence.'
13. The price was calculated so as to leave no incentive for photocopying the
textbook at the least expensive place that would normally be available to the stu-
dents.
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try to obtain the book beforehand. Those receiving such copies were
required to read it and make comments within three weeks of re-
ceiving it. The publisher would then return the books to the students,
within three weeks at the most, for their private use.
The students, who according to a questionnaire they filled out
afterwards did not realize that they were participating in an experi-
ment," were told by the representative that the same offer of speci-
men copies was also being made to students in similar courses at two
other universities, one of them in a foreign country. She claimed not
to be able to say how large the total group was, but that it was large.
It was thus possible to create a positive cost for transactions within
the overall group, and it became difficult for the individual student
at the University of Zurich to estimate the influence of her/his decision
on the outcome.
Before moving into a public-good context, we tried in the first
stage of the experiment to elicit participants' true willingness-to-pay
for specimen copy. The students were given an opportunity to offer
a written bid for the book, with the understanding that the ten highest
offers from all three universities would be accepted. 15 The bids from
the other universities were said to be already known, so that the
representative could determine immediately after the bidding which
(if any) of the Zurich students would get one. After the bidding, and
in our absence, the two highest bidders in the class were informed
by the representative that they were among the ten highest in the
overall group, and were excluded from the following phases of the
experiment.
In the second phase of the experiment, a situation characterized
by the usual collective-good properties was created. The students were
told that the author of the textbook had suggested to the publishing
company that it make an additional offer to the students. The idea
was said to involve a greater number of students in making this pre-
liminary examination of the text, and to compensate for the advantage
that the economically better-off students had had with the first offer.
14. Only one of the participants felt throughout the whole experiment, and only
two other students each in one of the various phases, that the situation might be arti-
ficial. All three claimed that this had had no effect on the decisions they had made.
15. Following Vickrey [1971] and Smith [1967], it could be argued that in such
a discriminative auction situation each accepted bid is filled at the bid price which
provides an incentive to underreveal demand. But if all bids are filled at the highest
rejected bid, each bidder has an incentive to bid true (in the case where each is bidding
for a single item). Moreover, Brubaker [1979, Table 1, footnote a], using both types
of auction rules, found that the difference between the two mean contributions was
very small ($32.28 under discriminative as opposed to $33.99 under the highest-re-
jected-bid rule). For this reason, and so as not to confuse the students with the use of
a complicated bidding rule, we used the more common discriminative rule.
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The publishing company had thus agreed to send a specimen copy
(still for commenting on) to each student if the participants at the
three universities taken together were able to raise SFr. 4,200. If this
amount was reached, each student would receive a copy regardless
of the size of his/her individual contribution; if it were not reached,
the company would not deliver any copies in addition to those
promised to the ten highest bidders. In case the amount raised ex-
ceeded SFr. 4,200, the individual contributions would be reduced
proportionally. After adding up the "Zurich" bids (again made
anonymously in writing) and the pretended offers from the other two
universities, the representative announced that the necessary amount
unfortunately had not been reached, and thus only the highest bidders
from phase 1 would be given copies. The publisher would, however,
hold the offer open for a few days should the student still want to try
to bring the money together.
We now came to the experiment's third phase. Here, in contrast
to the possible exclusion of individuals by virtue of excluding the
whole group (phase 2), there was no possibility of excluding anyone.
After the representative had left, we informed the students that the
author of the textbook had been concerned that the students would
not be able to bring together the SFr. 4,200. He thus had contacted
a scientific foundation abroad, ont. of whose major goals was to sup-
port teaching and research. It was said that the foundation had agreed
to cover the difference between the sum of the students' offers and
the amount required by the publisher. Copies of the agreement were
distributed to the students. This third offer clearly presented the
strongest incentive to bid as low as possible (down to half a Swiss
Franc: one had to bid at least this much to be included among those
receiving the book). 16
B. The Results
A comparison of the results for all three phases of the experiment
for the forty-two participants remaining at the enc1 17
 shows that the
three average offers are clearly positive (Table I). The F- test for the
repeated measures analysis of variance 18
 rejects the hypothesis that
16. It was explicitly pointed out by us that the foundation would pay the difference
even if only the minimal bid were offered.
17. Of the forty-seven students initially participating, we excluded those two who
made the highest bids in the first round, and three others who did not fill out the
questionnaire completely.
18. All computer calculations (repeated measures analysis of variance, as well
as standardized regressions) were done with the BMDP (Bio-Medical Decision Pro-
gram, Version 9, 1979) of UCLA. A full set of the results of the repeated measures
analysis of variance can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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TABLE I
OFFERS OF THE ZURICH STUDENTS AT THE THREE STAGES OF THE
EXPERIMENT, IN SFR
Statistics of repeated
measures
analysis of variancea 
Stage of experiment
	P.!	 P11
	1. 	 2.	 3.	 (d.f.)	 (d.f.)
Mean	 27.62	 26.57	 16.86
	 111.49	 20.02
Standard
deviation	 4.99	 4.83	 3.98	 (1: 40)	 (3; 123)
a. ti is an F-test of whether the expectation of the mean of the standardized sum of the three offers is zero
in the repeated measures analysis of variance. P11 is an F-test of whether the expectation of the mean differences
between all three offers is zero.
the expected means of the three stages are equal. Also the consecutive
bids clearly decrease from one stage to the next and differ significantly
from each other, 19
 showing that individuals react in a systematic and
predictable way when the incentive structure is changed. These results
are in accordance with those of recent experiments done by others 2°
and confirm the relevance of the free-rider hypothesis.
However, in accordance with all experiments done so far, 21
 the
extent of the free riding also was rather modest.
Conditional on the possibility of sampling errors, and assuming
that positive bids in the first stage represent true willingness-to-pay,
it can be concluded that the forty-two students voluntarily offered
on the average more than 61 percent of their estimated true willing-
ness-to-pay (offer 3 divided by offer 1). Under the necessity of col-
lectively offering the specified sum, about 96 percent of the estimated
true willingness-to-pay was offered (offer 2 divided by offer 1): i.e.,
the possibility of individual exclusion through group exclusion re-
sulted in revealing about 35 percent of the true willingness-to-pay
more than when that possibility was ruled out.
In toto, these results are inconsistent with the free-rider view that
dominates the traditional literature. In our experiment the partici-
19. The mean (standard deviation) of the difference between offers 1 and 2 is 1.05
(0.48); for offers 2 and 3, it is 9.71 (1.78). The F-test of whether the expectation of the
means of differences between two offers differs significantly shows values of 4.21 (offers
1 and 2) and 13.35 (offers 2 and 3). This indicates statistical significance at least at the
95 percent confidence level.
20. See Marwell and Ames [1979, 1980a, 1980b1, Alfano and Marwell [1980],
Guttman [1979], and Chamberlin [1978].
21. See the experiments mentioned above (compare footnote 20 ,. Brubaker [1979].
and the classic investigations by Bohm [1972] and Sweeney [1973. 1974].
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pants do not seem to be inclined to behave strategically to a very great
extent even if there is an opportunity to do so. However, they also are
not willing voluntarily to reveal their true willingness-to-pay.
III. EVALUATION OF THE RESULTS
Some objections can be raised with regard to our results and their
interpretation, relating either to the relevance of the situation for the
students at the individual stages, or to the fact that the whole ex-
periment was done only once.
To start with the first set of possible objections:
1. It can be argued that the object being made available in the
experiment, the specimen copy, was not relevant to the participants
and that thus not too much confidence should be placed in the indi-
vidual offers. The answers to the questionnaire, however, show that
all of the students except two considered the specimen copy to be very
relevant. In spite of this the experiment's individual phases were not
treated the same. In the first round some of the students made offers
clearly below their true willingness-to-pay; i.e., ten students offered
zero Swiss Francs here but positive amounts of money in the next two
rounds. 22 One possible explanation for this result may be that some
students may have tried to form coalitions: One student in a coalition
is chosen to make a very high bid, and the remaining coalition part-
ners, having no incentive to reveal their true willingness-to-pay, bid
little or nothing. The possibility of forming coalitions cannot be ex-
cluded a priori and does indeed create a severe problem (but for all
methods for revealing individual preferences for a public good). Op-
portunities for forming coalitions, however, were greatly limited by
the representative's request for written bids (without discussion) and
by the strong control exercised by us.23
Another possible explanation may be that these students thought
that the phase-one offer was "unfair" because low-income students
would a priori suffer a disadvantage. Low-income students might have
thought that in an auction-like situation their offer would have no
chance to be among the ten highest. They thus would not make a se-
rious offer here, and what they would offer would then most probably
be below their true willingness-to-pay. If income is really so important
for the size of the offers in the first round, then it should be the
22. Their average offer was SFr. 21.55 in the second round, and SFr. 14.95 in the
third round; both means differ significantly from zero at the 99 percent confidence
level.
23. All forty-two students said in their questionnaires that they had been effec-
tively prevented from forming such coalitions.
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dominant explanatory factor in a multiple regression trying to explain
(in a statistical sense) the individual bids. To fulfill the ceteris paribus
conditions, other independent variables have to be included, such as
the subjective importance of the field "economic policy" in the
forthcoming final examination, and the time restriction for reading
and commenting on the specimen copy. The time restriction variable
is a dummy variable with 0 = 3 weeks sufficient for reading and
commenting, and 1 = 3 weeks not sufficient. The importance variable
is the subjective estimated weight of the examination in this subject
and varies from 1/3 to 1/32. The result for the OLS regression analysis
for the first offer of the forty-two students is given below.24
 The figures
in parentheses below the parameter estimates indicate the t-value;
one asterisk indicates statistical significance at the 99 percent confi-
.dence level, using a two-tailed test. The figures in brackets are the
/3-coefficients, showing the total influence of the variable:
Offer 1 = —5.93 + 0.030*
(8.55)
[0.712]
— 5.406
(-1.30)
[-0.304]
+ 0.939*
(4.41)
[0.402]
IP = 0.77;
income (in Swiss Francs)
time restriction for reading
and commenting
importance of the field
"economic policy"
P-value = 43.24; d.f. = 38.
This result gives some evidence that income is the dominant factor
influencing the size of the forty-two students' first offer. This is shown
by the absolutely largest size of the 0-coefficient, and by this variable
having the most significant impact. That means that if ceteris paribus
conditions are fulfilled, the richer the students are, the higher the
offers will be: The offer rises 3 Swiss Francs for every additional 100
Swiss Francs of income. The only other variable that has a significant
influence is "importance of the field." From this we can conclude that
part of the students may tend to make an offer below their true will-
ingness-to-pay as they expect to lose in any case because of their low
income.
24. If we additionally include other independent variables such as time left until
the final examination, or the possibility of photocopying the specimen copy at a lower
than normally available price, the results does not improve.
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One way to explore the influence that the understated bids of
lower income people may have on the average bid of the first round
is to reestimate the above bidding function under exclusion of the ten
zero bidders. The estimated coefficients can then be used to calculate
the positive bids of these ten bidders, assuming that their demand
behavior is not too deviant from that of the others. This was done and
led to a somewhat higher average offer of SFr. 31.89 (instead of SFr.
27.62) in the first stage; but the general results did not change very
much. 25
2. Another objection may be that there was no real public-good
situation for the participants in the experiment's second phase be-
cause of variation in perceptions of group size. Each participant could
calculate that with a total number of participants of somewhat more
than one hundred (105 participants) a normal student price of SFr.
40 would be sufficient to reach the fixed sum of SFr. 4,200. It is,
however, also possible for a student to imagine that there are still more
participants, resulting in his/her making, ceteris paribus, a bid lower
than SFr. 40. The mental state typical of a public-good situation (i.e.,
individual numerical imperceptibility) is then not created, and we
can expect that the higher the estimate of the group size is, the lower
the individual bid will be. To test this important objection, we have
included the group size as individually estimated by the forty-two
participants26
 as an independent variable in the OLS regression
equation explaining the offers at the second stage, with the expecta-
tion of a highly significant negative sign for this variable.
The result did show a negative sign for the group size variable,
but the coefficient was not significant. 27
 It thus seems that we were
able to create what was roughly a public-good situation. The question
then arises, however, as to why the average bid was more than SFr.
26 in this stage of the experiment. We could conclude that there are
strong forces running counter to the tendency to behave as a free rider.
It might be that in this round the lower income students saw a real
chance to get a specimen copy by acting cooperatively and that they
25. Instead of 61 percent, now 53 percent of the true willingness-to-pay is revealed
(offer 3 divided by the modified first offer); under the restriction of collectively bringing
together a fixed sum, 84 percent instead of 96 percent of the true willingness-to-pay
is revealed.
26. To get these figures, we explicitly asked in the questionnaire what the re-
spondent estimated the group size to be and how this was calculated. Of the forty-two
students, fourteen took the number of Zurich participants and simply multiplied it
by three; twenty-eight students made separate "guesstimates" of the number of par-
ticipants at the two other universities and added them to the Zurich students.
27. Explaining offer 2, the estimated coefficient for the group-size variable
(measured in absolute units) is —0.006, and the corresponding t-statistic has a value
of —0.60.
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were thus willing to make an offer that came close to their true will-
ingness-to-pay. 28
3. Though the offers at the third stage of the experiment were,
as expected, the lowest, they were still on the average more than 50
percent of the first bid. As argued by Brubaker [1975, p. 157] and
Smith [1977, p. 1136], one reason for such a puzzling result may be that
strategic behavior is so costly for the individual relative to expected
benefit that a willingness-to-pay not far below the true one is revealed.
However, in our situation there was no need to undertake a strategic
calculation. Thus, our result indicates that there are forces running
counter to extensive free riding—and we are as surprised as the reader
by the strength of these forces. Ex post one can think of various pos-
sible explanations for our results, which indicates (as stated at the
beginning) that the free-rider hypothesis provides only a partial de-
scription of the real world.
Possibly more important than these three objections may be that
the results of only one experiment do not let us conclude what the
individual's behavior would be like in a real public-good situation. The
general results obtained by Brubaker (personal communication) and
by Marwell and his colleagues 29
 in their repetitions of public-good
experiments were not different from those they obtained the first time
around. However, as these repetitions were done with different groups
of participants and not with the same people, they show only that
people do not behave strategically in an isolated and one-time ex-
perimental laboratory situation. If such an experiment (even slightly
changed) is repeated with the same people, it cannot be excluded that
the participants will learn and then begin to act more and more
strategically, i.e., as utility maximizers in a strongly selfish way. Such
kinds of learning effects have been found recently by Plott [1979] in
a series of market experiments. However, public-good decisions occur
in a context that is quite different from the market situation, and it
is therefore open whether these results obtained for the market would
hold generally. Results of a recent repetitive experiment by Smith
[1979b,1980] do not confirm the strong version of the free-rider hy-
pothesis though considerable motives for this were created (the
number of participants in the experiment was, however, quite
small).
28. The effect we would expect is a decline in the importance of income for
explaining the second (as compared with the first) offer. This was indeed the case: the
estimated coefficient (0.014:,,t = 4.79; fl = 0.610) is smaller, but there is no significant
difference between the two fl-coefficients.
29. Alfano and Marwell [1980], and Marwell and Ames [1980a].
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III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The main result of our experimental study in public microeco-
nomics is that there is only modest evidence for free riding as com-
pared with the importance attributed to it in the literature. The in-
dividuals did systematically behave as free riders in line with the
different incentives offered by the experiment's three stages, but the
extent to which free riding occurred was not great. This conclusion
is additionally supported by the fact that we used as subjects students
in economics who had just been studying the free-rider problem. Our
main result is also consistent with previous experiments and various
case studies30 that show that the free-rider problem cannot always
be presumed to occur. It was not our aim to search out in detail the
reasons that strong free riding does not occur, 31
 but we may conclude
that the present dominance of the free-rider hypothesis rather indi-
cates an incompleteness in standard public microeconomics than
provides a description of the real world.
In our view, the next step should be to test explicitly the economic
approach against alternative approaches to explaining individual
behavior in a public-good situation. This would help economists to
avoid the pitfall of believing that their traditional hypotheses form
the only or most valid approach to explaining human behavior, though
there is no question that they have a contribution to make. 32
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